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# CHAPTER ONE

## Conversation Analysis Methodology

In this chapter I will illustrate the basic principles of Conversation Analysis (CA) using extracts mostly from ordinary conversation; data will not be presented from the language classroom<sup>1</sup> (L2 classroom) until later chapters so that I am able to highlight similarities and differences. Ordinary conversation has a “baseline” status in CA (Sacks et al., 1974) and L2 classroom interaction will be portrayed in chapters 2 to 5 as a variety of institutional discourse. It is essential to specify very explicitly the principles which underlie ordinary conversation in order to have a firm foundation on which to analyse talk in the institutional setting of L2 classrooms around the world.

This chapter explains the relationship between ethnomethodology and CA, outlining five fundamental principles which underlie ethnomethodology and hence CA. After outlining the aims and principles of CA, I introduce the interactional organisations of sequence (adjacency pairs), preference, turn-taking and repair. I then explain the typical analytical procedures followed in CA and introduce the CA perspective on context. The chapter concludes with the argument that a “linguistic” version of CA has diverged from ethnomethodological CA.

### *1.1 History and Development of CA*

A detailed history of the development of ethnomethodology and CA is not relevant to the discussion and may be found elsewhere<sup>2</sup>. Very briefly, however, the principal originator of CA was Harvey Sacks, who worked at the University of California until his accidental death in 1975. It appears that his innovation was due to the convergence of three factors. Firstly, his acquaintance with Harold Garfinkel, the key figure in ethnomethodology. Secondly, Sack's decision to investigate the organisation of social interaction by analysing naturally occurring mundane talk. Thirdly, the new technology of audio recording, which enabled this analysis to take place. The idea with which Sacks was working was that there is 'order at all points' in interaction, i.e. that talk in interaction is systematically organized and deeply ordered and methodic. This was an extremely radical idea in the 1960s as audio recording was only just emerging, conversation had not yet been studied and the dominant linguistic view was the Chomskian one that "ordinary talk could not be the object of study for linguistics since it is too disordered; it is an essentially degenerate realization of linguistic competence" (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998, p. 22).

A recurrent theme in this chapter will be the fundamental differences between CA methodology and approaches typical of linguistics. The seminal texts on CA have been written by sociologists<sup>3</sup> and, as Heritage (1984b, p. 234) notes, CA studies have been presented in a style which presumes a competent audience and features of the style make access to their methods and findings difficult; this is doubly the case with writings on ethnomethodology. It needs first to be understood that CA was started by Harvey Sacks as a sociological "naturalistic observational discipline that could deal with the details of social action rigorously, empirically and formally." (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973, pp. 289-90).

In the course of this chapter I will try to explicate *why* CA methodology proceeds as it does and why, in spite of some fundamental differences with linguistics methodology, it is a suitable methodology for applied linguists to use. These

differences will be teased out during the course of this chapter. At the start, however, we should be clear that there is a fundamental difference between the “CA mentality” and the “linguistic mentality” in relation to the status of language. CA's primary interest is in the social act whereas a linguist's primary interest is normally in language:

CA is only marginally interested in language as such; its actual object of study is the interactional organization of social activities. CA is a radical departure from other forms of linguistically oriented analysis in that the production of utterances, and more particularly the sense they obtain, is seen not in terms of the structure of language, but first and foremost as a practical social accomplishment. That is, words used in talk are not studied as semantic units, but as products or objects which are designed and used in terms of the activities being negotiated in the talk. (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998, p. 14).

## 1.2 *Ethnomethodology*

The basic relationship between ethnomethodology and CA is that the first subsumes the second; ethnomethodology studies the principles on which people base their social actions, whilst CA focuses more narrowly on the principles which people use to interact with each other by means of language. Ethnomethodology is not well known outside the area; the writings of ethnomethodologists tend to be difficult to access and Boyle (1997, p. 29) notes that Garfinkel “established a standard of obscurity that most ethnomethodologists seem compelled to follow.” Nonetheless, it is especially important for linguists to understand the fundamental principles of ethnomethodology since, as we have already noted, ethnomethodology and CA<sup>4</sup> are in many ways very different to approaches typically used in linguistics. What is ethnomethodology and why should it be used as the basis of the study of human interaction when it is not a linguistic discipline? One way to understand the project of ethnomethodology and CA is to imagine that an alien has been sent from a civilisation which is totally different to ours and which does not have the concept of language as we know it; they may communicate in images by telepathy, for example, and find language puzzlingly indirect, ambiguous and primitive. The alien's brief is to understand and describe the basis of human behaviour and communication. Our project is to explain to the alien the principles according to which people act and use language to interact.

According to Heritage (1984b, p. 4) “The term ‘ethnomethodology’ refers to the study of ... the body of common-sense knowledge and the range of procedures and considerations by means of which the ordinary members of society make sense of, find their way about in, and act on the circumstances in which they find themselves.” Ethno methods can be seen as the interpretative procedures used by social actors in situ. Garfinkel's work can be seen as a reaction to the previously dominant top-down Parsonian<sup>5</sup> sociology, which assumed the superiority of the sociologist's knowledge over that of members of society, who were seen as cultural and psychological “dopes” who unthinkingly acted out the macro rules of society as explicated by the sociologist. Garfinkel, however, rejected analytical frameworks which assume the superiority of social science knowledge over the lay social actor's knowledge and sought an answer to the question: “how do social actors come to know, and know in common, what they are doing and the circumstances in which they

are doing it?" (Heritage, 1984, p. 76). This can be understood as a rejection of an *etic* or external analyst's perspective on human behaviour in favour of an *emic* or participant's perspective. Since the emic/etic distinction is vital to this monograph, we need to define it at this point. According to Pike:

The etic viewpoint studies behaviour as from outside of a particular system, and as an essential initial approach to an alien system. The emic viewpoint results from studying behaviour as from inside the system... Descriptions or analyses from the etic standpoint are 'alien' in view, with criteria external to the system. Emic descriptions provide an internal view, with criteria chosen from within the system. (Pike, 1967, p. 37)

Garfinkel's assumption was that people must make normative use of a number of principles in order to display their actions to each other and allow others to make sense of them. However, these principles are used on a constant basis in everyday life and have become automatised to the extent that they have a taken-for-granted or *seen but unnoticed* status which "entitle persons to conduct their common conversational affairs without interference." (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 42). Garfinkel was, then, trying to make explicit and visible those principles which we orient to in everyday life and of which we have implicit knowledge. The basic problem which Garfinkel faced was that of uncovering and identifying these normative practices; as they are seen but unnoticed they are not easily perceptible when the norms are being followed. However, he noticed that the norms did become more identifiable when the norms were being breached. In an uncharacteristically comprehensible sentence, Garfinkel (1967, p. 37) notes that "For these background expectancies to come into view one must either be a stranger to the "life as usual" character of everyday scenes, or become estranged from them." This point explains CA's interest in deviant case analysis, which will be discussed later. Garfinkel therefore devised a series of famous "breaching experiments" which are described in detail in Garfinkel (1967). In a counselling experiment, for example, subjects asked 10 questions for advice on personal problems to a "counsellor" hidden behind a screen; they were then given yes/no answers without any further explanation. 5 *yes* answers and 5 *no* answers were allocated on a completely random basis, unknown to the subjects. In spite of this, subjects were determined to make sense of the answers.

Garfinkel designed experiments like these to breach the norms, to undermine the subject's belief in reciprocity of perspectives in which the conversational partner is co-operating in a shared reality or intersubjectivity. However, Garfinkel found, as in the case above, that this was extremely difficult to accomplish as subjects constantly made adjustments and found ways to maintain their belief in a shared reality in which both participants were orienting to the same norms. As Heritage (1984, p. 96) puts it: "At every possible point, the participants seemed to be willing to give the 'underlying pattern' the benefit of the doubt. They assumed it was operative despite appearances to the contrary and ... they waited for the pattern to reassert itself in new evidences which would enable them to discount any prior discrepancies." Taken as a whole, these breaching experiments demonstrated that utterances in conversation are not treated literally but are understood by reference to context and assumptions about the other party, as part of an emerging sequence and with both retrospective and prospective significance, e.g., the significance of a question may emerge subsequently.

So in view of the vagueness and indexicality of conversational utterances, intersubjectivity between interactants can only be maintained if the interactants agree to fill-in all of the contextual detail and co-operate; this is similar to Grice's (1975) co-operative principle. Therefore victims of breaching experiments (e.g. Garfinkel, 1967, p. 43) tend to react with "moral" outrage because the failure to co-operate "threatens the very possibility of mutual understanding and, with it, the existence of a shared world." (Heritage, 1984, p. 95). Breaches of the ethnomethodological principles in conversation are therefore said to be 'morally sanctionable'. Garfinkel (1967) reports that many of the students who undertook his breaching experiments experienced upsetting and very hostile reactions from friends and family as a result.

### 1.3 *The Principles of Ethnomethodology*

We will now introduce five fundamental and interlocked principles which underlie ethnomethodology<sup>6</sup> and also CA, although they are rarely referred to explicitly in published accounts of CA methodology.

#### *Indexicality*

Of the ethnomethodological principles reviewed here, indexicality or context-boundedness may be the most familiar. Interactants generally do not make every single aspect of their intended meaning explicit, relying on mutually understood features of the background context to supply additional information. According to Boyle (2000b, p. 31) ethnomethodology's unique contribution to the discussion of indexicality is that indexical knowledge is not just something in the environment but also something talked into being by interactants. In other words, they display through their utterances which aspects of context they are orienting to at any given time and there is a reflexive relationship between talk and context. *This provides an analytical resource and underlies CA's insistence that we invoke contextual features in analysis only when it is evident in the details of the interaction that the participants themselves are orienting to such features.* There is also a clear link between indexicality and Garfinkel's breaching experiments. People cannot elaborate all aspects of what they are talking about because it is too time-consuming and difficult, so "Indexicality allows utterances to represent vastly more than is said and thereby makes mundane conversation possible." (Boyle, 2000a, pp. 32-33).

#### *The Documentary Method of Interpretation*

The documentary method of interpretation is central to ethnomethodology. It treats any actual real-world action as a 'document' or an example of a previously known pattern. There are similarities here with schema theory<sup>7</sup>. So in practical terms if anyone greets us by saying "Hi" we treat that action as a document and relate it to previously known patterns, normally identify it as a greeting and respond accordingly. Importantly, the claim is not only that this is the method of interpretation which interactants use, but also that this is the fundamental method which analysts must use in analysing social interaction as it is an emic methodology. It should also be noted that there is a reflexive relationship between the patterns and the individual actions so that if, for example, we encounter a new form of greeting, our underlying pattern or schema of forms of greeting is updated. In order to exemplify the documentary method of interpretation in practice, we will consider the following extract from a

staffroom discussion between three ESOL teachers in a language school in the UK. ESOL teachers commonly use nationality to index various characteristics of students, with southern Europeans thought to be talkative and East Asians thought to be quiet in class. Ed enters the staffroom<sup>8</sup>:

#### Extract 1.1

- 1 Ed: my: God it's quiet in there.  
2 Harry: hhhh  
3 Ed: it's like working in a library in there.  
4 Harry: anyway (0.5) you've ()  
5 Ed: I can't get anything out of them. (1.0) it's-there are three  
6 Japanese students and  
7 Keith: oh right.

(Richards, 1996, p. 258)

Up to line 5 the listeners only know that the learners are quiet. On receipt of line 6, however, using the documentary method of interpretation, Keith is able to match the quietness to a previously known pattern or schema and reach a new understanding of the situation, so his interruptive *oh* in line 7 marks a change of information state (Heritage, 1984a). When the documentary method of interpretation is applied to sequential interaction, its explanatory power becomes extremely significant. *Any turn at talk (such as line 7) becomes a document or display of a cognitive, emotional and attitudinal state, an analysis of context and of the previous turn(s) in the sequence and a social action which renews the context.*

#### *The Reciprocity of Perspectives*

Another principle which social actors use involves a willingness to adopt a reciprocity of perspectives, i.e. to agree that we are following the same norms, to show affiliation to the other person's perspective and try to achieve intersubjectivity. This is closely linked to indexicality, which cannot function unless all parties can agree to index their interaction in the same way. This is demonstrated by Garfinkel's breaching experiments, which are simultaneously breaching indexicality and reciprocity of perspectives. Recipients of the breaching react strongly because the breaches challenge the entire basis of intersubjectivity, in which indexical expressions can be used without elaboration. This principle does *not* mean that people actually succeed in reaching the same perspective on everything all of the time; this is obviously not the case. Rather, to follow the principle means to agree that we are following the same norms in interaction, including a structural bias towards co-operation. In many ways this is similar to Grice's (1975) Co-operative Principle.

This principle also functions as a constitutive norm and template for interpretation, so we are able to recognise that, in the case of a failure of intersubjectivity, that the failure has occurred by reference to the normal expectation of willingness to adopt reciprocity of perspectives. This principle is also closely linked to preference organisation in CA, which can be seen as a structural bias towards affiliation and reciprocity of perspectives. The preferred action is seen but unnoticed, and promotes affiliation and reciprocity of perspectives, whereas the

dispreferred action is noticeable and accountable, may be sanctionable and works against affiliation and reciprocity of perspectives.

### *Normative Accountability*

The principle of the normative accountability of actions is perhaps the key to understanding the ethnomethodological basis of CA and also the one which is the furthest removed from linguistic concepts. At this point we should clarify the position on norms in ethnomethodology, which should be clearly differentiated from the descriptivist “rules and units” approach typical of linguistics. Norms are understood in ethnomethodology as constitutive of action rather than regulative. It is by reference to norms that interactants can design their own social actions and interpret those of others.

For example, when one social actor greets another, a greeting response is the norm, or has *seen but unnoticed* status. Failure to respond in this case, however, may be noticeable, accountable and sanctionable. Here we use a norm of behaviour as a point of reference or action template for interpretation rather than a rule. An actor may decide to return a greeting, but “The actor who is determined to declare or continue a quarrel can do so by visibly refusing to return a greeting and leaving the other to draw the conclusion.” (Heritage, 1984, p. 118). The norms are constitutive in that they constitute the setting in which the actions may be performed and interpreted. The seen but unnoticed route is that which is overwhelmingly used to accomplish everyday actions. We will see later in the chapter that the same situation applies to CA with respect to norms. CA states norms (or action templates) of conduct with respect to organisations of turn-taking, sequence, repair and preference. This does not mean that interactants have to slavishly follow these norms, but rather that these are points of reference by which we can design and perform our social actions, analyse and evaluate the conduct of another, draw conclusions and hold them accountable. So, for example, interactants can and do deviate from the norms, interrupt others or fail to provide the second part to an adjacency pair and fellow interactants can evaluate these actions as noticeable and accountable *by reference to the norms*.

The four other ethnomethodological principles can be seen to constitute interlocking norms or background expectancies of behaviour, adherence to which enables social actors to carry on everyday action and interaction in a seen but unnoticed or normal way. The principle of normative accountability is the “moral force” which holds all the other principles together by providing a basis for interpretation and social action.

### *Reflexivity*

This term is widely used in the social sciences, but it has a very specific meaning in ethnomethodology. The principle of reflexivity states that the same set of methods or procedures are responsible for both the production of actions/utterances and their interpretation. This principle underlies the CA mechanism of the adjacency pair. Staying with the greeting-greeting adjacency pair, the principle would be manifested as follows. If two acquaintances approach each other along a corridor for the first time one morning and one issues a greeting, then s/he has performed the first part of an adjacency pair. From the perspective of reflexivity, the greeter has not only performed an action but also created a context for its interpretation. If the other person

responds with a greeting, they have not only performed an action but also displayed an interpretation of the first action as a greeting. We can see the other ethnomethodological principles manifest in this example as well. By returning greetings, both interactants demonstrate that they are using the documentary method of interpretation, or that they are both orienting to the same schemata. They further orient to indexicality in that they display understanding that the context requires a greeting to be performed. Reciprocity of perspectives is achieved in that both interactants have displayed a similar understanding of context. The principle of normative accountability of actions is manifest here in that failure to return a greeting will be noticeable, accountable and sanctionable<sup>9</sup>.

This concentration of fundamental principles into a very short and simple pair of actions perhaps explains why we become perplexed or annoyed if we greet other people and they fail to return the greeting. This failure is potentially sanctionable in that we may decide to retaliate, e.g. by snubbing that person in turn in future. There is also a semiotic sense in which an exchange of greetings is an initial declaration of mutual orientation to the ethnomethodological principles. Failure to do so may be a semiotic indicator of social trouble looming. It should be stressed that these norms are *not* prescriptive and restrictive rules, but rather the means or points of reference by which we can express social actions and others can interpret them. We are not obliged to follow the seen but unnoticed route and be affiliative. Indeed, we may sometimes decide that we want to display a total lack of affiliation to someone and demonstrate that we do not reciprocate any perspectives with them. In this case it is precisely by reference to the norms that we display our attitude to this person, namely by deliberately going against the norms. For example, on receipt of an invitation to the person's house, we may proclaim "What? Go to your house? I'd rather die!" In the same way, (using the principle of reflexivity) recipients interpret our display by reference to the norms.

#### 1.4 Aims of CA

From one perspective, CA is the result of applying ethnomethodological principles to naturally occurring talk. *Talk-in-interaction* has become the accepted superordinate term to refer to the object of CA research (Drew and Heritage, 1992, p. 4). According to Psathas (1995), CA studies the organisation and order of social action in interaction. This organisation and order is one produced by the interactants in situ and oriented to by them. The analyst's task is to develop an emic perspective, to uncover and describe this organization and order; the main interest is in uncovering the underlying *machinery* which enables interactants to achieve this organisation and order:

Our aim is ... to get into a position to transform ... our view of what happened here as some interaction that could be treated as the thing we're studying, to interactions being spewed out by a machinery, the machinery being what we're trying to find; where, in order to find it we've got to get a whole bunch of its products. (Sacks, 1992, vol. 2, p. 169)

So one principal aim is to characterise the organisation of the interaction by abstracting from exemplars of specimens of interaction and to uncover the emic logic underlying the organisation. A common misconception is that CA is obsessed with micro detail and has nothing to say about interactional organisation on a larger



scale. This monograph, however, portrays the interactional architecture of the L2 classroom. Another principal aim of CA is to trace the development of intersubjectivity in an action sequence. This does *not* mean that CA provides access to participants' cognitive or psychological states<sup>10</sup>. Rather, it means that analysts trace how participants analyse and interpret each others' actions and develop a shared understanding of the progress of the interaction. So CA practitioners aim "to discover how participants understand and respond to one another in their turns at talk, with a central focus on how sequences of action are generated." (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998, p. 14)

## 1.5 Principles of CA

We previously reviewed the basic principles underlying ethnomethodology. These are generic principles which may be used to study any kind of human action; CA focuses solely on human actions which are manifested through talk<sup>11</sup>. Therefore, CA has developed its own subset of principles and procedures, which will now be discussed; their links back to ethnomethodological principles will be traced where appropriate. As with other forms of qualitative research, the principles are not to be considered as a formula or to be applied in a mechanistic fashion. It is essential to adopt a conversation analytic mentality which "involves more a cast of mind, or a way of seeing, than a static and prescriptive set of instructions which analysts bring to bear on the data." (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998, p. 94).

Sacks's most original idea, according to Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998), is that there is order at all points in interaction. This can be traced back to Garfinkel's view of people as rational actors who take active decisions rather than being passive "dopes". As already noted, this was an extremely radical idea in the 1960s as the dominant linguistic view was that conversation was too disordered to be studied. This idea leads to the concept of *rational* design in interaction, that is that talk in interaction is systematically organised, deeply ordered and methodic. When we speak of the rational organisation of interaction, this does not in any way imply that everything a speaker says seems rational or logical to everyone else, but rather that interaction is structurally organised. The principle of rational organisation (explored in Chapter 5) is vital to an understanding of institutional discourse. Different institutions have different institutional aims and organisations of the interaction appropriate to those aims.

A second principle of CA is that contributions to interaction are *context-shaped* and *context-renewing*. Contributions are context-shaped in that they cannot be adequately understood except by reference to the sequential environment in which they occur and in which the participants design them to occur. Contributions are context-renewing in that they inevitably form part of the sequential environment in which a next contribution will occur. As Heritage (1984, p. 242) puts it, "The context of a next action is repeatedly renewed with every current action," and is transformable at any moment. This principle can be traced to Garfinkels' principles of indexicality, reflexivity and the documentary method of interpretation; see section 1.3.

The third principle is that no order of detail can be dismissed, a priori, as disorderly, accidental or irrelevant (Heritage 1984b, p. 241). This principle follows from the first two and can be seen to underlie the development of the highly detailed CA transcription system, its minute analysis of the detail of naturally occurring data and its highly empirical orientation. There is a great deal to be said on the matter of transcription and there are inevitably some differences between linguists (particularly

phonologists) and CA practitioners here. However, since these issues are not of central relevance to the argument here, the reader is referred to the detailed discussions in ten Have (1999), Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998), and Markee (2000). For illustrations of the benefits of CA transcription, see Wei (2002) and Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998). For present purposes we need only note the following.

- CA practitioners regard the recordings of naturally occurring interaction as the primary data
- Transcripts are designed to make the primary data available for intensive analytic consideration by the analyst and other readers.
- Transcripts are inevitably incomplete, selective renderings of the primary data which invariably involve a trade-off between readability and comprehensiveness

The fourth principle which follows from this is that analysis is bottom-up and data driven; we should not approach the data with any prior theoretical assumptions or assume that any background or contextual detail are relevant. So in CA it is not relevant to invoke power, gender, race or any other contextual factor unless and until there is evidence in the details of the interaction that the participants themselves are orienting to them. This relates back to ethnomethodological principle of reflexivity. In Seedhouse (1998a), for example, I examined interaction in German between a female Greek immigrant to Germany (NNS) conversing with a German shop worker (NS) who was delivering soft drinks to her flat. At one point the native speaker says: "Achsoo, Vater kommen, ja." which may be roughly translated as "Oh well, father come, yes." I argue that NS is orienting to the NNS's trouble with the L2 by producing minimalised, pidginised interlanguage forms himself, which is a form of modified speech or accommodation. From the CA perspective, it now *and only now* becomes valid to discuss the identities of native-speaker and non-native-speaker or to speak of a cross-cultural encounter because there is now evidence that the participants are orienting to such constructs in the details of their talk<sup>12</sup>. So it is incorrect to say that CA does not consider background or contextual details; the point is that it does so only if and when close analysis reveals participants' orientation to such details (see sections 1.8 and 2.6 for further discussion).

Another way of presenting the principles of CA is in relation to the questions which it asks. The essential question which we must ask at all stages of CA analysis of data is "Why that, in that way, right now?" This encapsulates the perspective of interaction as action (why that) which is expressed by means of linguistic forms (in that way) in a developing sequence (right now). Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998, p. 99) suggest that there are "... two core analytic questions in CA: What interactional business is being mediated or accomplished through the use of a sequential pattern? How do participants demonstrate their active orientation to this business?" Alternatively, Ten Have (1999, p. 15) proposes that CA's basic analytic strategy is to consider any point in the data and try to find out the kind of problem for which doing this might be a solution. This strategy emphasises the social action orientation of CA and considers what the interactants are trying to achieve in terms of social actions. Sack's early lectures were often labelled to express this, e.g. How to avoid giving help without refusing to give it (treat the circumstance as a joke).

We will now look at four different but related types of interactional organisation which were uncovered by Sacks and associates by grappling with their data and which can now be employed in analysis by CA practitioners. We will attempt to relate these back to the principles of ethnomethodology where appropriate. First we should clarify that these organisations are *definitely not* the same as 'units of analysis' in the linguistic sense. Rather, they should be understood as interactional organisations which interactants use normatively and reflexively both as an action template for the production of their social actions and as a point of reference for the interpretation of their actions. We as analysts should use them in the same way. The organisations are part of the context-free machinery which we make use of to orientate ourselves in indexical interaction i.e. we employ them in a context-sensitive way. Similarly, we are only able to interpret the context-sensitive social actions of others because there is a context-free machinery by reference to which we can make sense of them.

### *Adjacency Pairs*

The concept of the adjacency pair is one which (if considered purely as a structural phenomenon) may appear to be so obvious and superficial that it is hardly worth mentioning. However, the action sequence or sequence organisation is the essential key to understanding how CA analysis works and its links to its ethnomethodological roots<sup>13</sup>. Therefore we will need to spend some time considering the adjacency pair as the most common and prevalent manifestation of the concept of linked actions in an action sequence. These are, as Heritage (1984b, p. 256) puts it, "the basic building-blocks of intersubjectivity." There are of course a number of other possible sequence organisations, which cannot be dealt with here for reasons of space. Adjacency pairs are paired utterances such that on production of the first part of the pair (e.g. question) the second part of the pair (answer) becomes *conditionally relevant*. If, however, the second part is not immediately produced, it may nonetheless remain relevant and accountable and appear later, or its absence may be accounted for.

#### Extract 1.2

- |   |     |                              |    |
|---|-----|------------------------------|----|
| 1 | A : | can I have a bottle of Mich? | Q1 |
| 2 | B:  | are you over twenty-one?     | Q2 |
| 3 | A:  | no.                          | A2 |
| 4 | B:  | no                           | A1 |

(Levinson, 1983, p. 304)

In the above extract in a liquor store A is not old enough to buy beer and one question-answer adjacency pair (lines 2 and 3) is embedded in another (lines 1 and 4). What this sequence also demonstrates is that action sequences do not necessarily unroll in a linear fashion (Q1-A1, Q2-A2) and hence that serial order is not necessarily the same thing as sequential order. When this is the case, the different types of interactional organisation (here, adjacency pair and turn-taking) combine in a mutually reinforcing fashion to provide normative points of reference which enable

interactants (and analysts) to orientate themselves. Furthermore, the adjacency pair concept does not claim that second parts are always provided for first parts. Rather, it is a *normative* frame of reference which provides a framework for understanding actions and providing accountability. So if we ask a question to someone who does not then provide an answer, we may draw conclusions about that person. Deviant case analysis is used in CA to confirm the normative character of identified organisations. In the case of adjacency pairs, we can demonstrate this by examining the following cases from Atkinson and Drew (1979, p. 52):

#### Extract 1.3

- |   |    |   |
|---|----|---|
| 1 | A: | is there something bothering you or not?<br>(1.0) |
| 2 | A: | yes or no<br>(1.5)                                |
| 3 | A: | eh?   |
| 4 | B: | no.   |

#### Extract 1.4

- |   |         |                                    |
|---|---------|------------------------------------|
| 1 | Child:  | have to cut the:se Mummy.<br>(1.3) |
| 2 | Child:  | won't we Mummy<br>(1.5)            |
| 3 | Child:  | won't we                           |
| 4 | Mother: | yes.                               |

The above extracts contain deviant cases because an answer has become conditionally relevant after the question but no answer has been received, nor has the lack of an answer been accounted for; the second part is therefore noticeably absent and accountable. That this is also A's and the child's analysis in extracts 1.3 and 1.4 is demonstrated by their repetition and re-repetition of their questions. The longer the second part remains absent, the more accountable and sanctionable it becomes<sup>14</sup>. This is evidenced by the increasingly short and curt linguistic forms which are used to express the first and second repetitions of their questions. This is an example of CA analysts' interest in linguistic forms; the interest is not in the linguistic forms themselves, but rather in the way in which they are used to embody and express subtle differences in social actions. We encountered in section 1.5 the fundamental CA question "Why this, in this way, right now?" If we look at line 3 in extracts 1.3 and 1.4 we can obtain clear answers to these questions. The questioner in both cases is insisting on receiving an answer to a previously posed question, using increasingly curt linguistic forms and at this point in the action sequence because the two previous questions have not received the relevant second part. The extracts also demonstrate that questioners orient to their questions having a normative force with sequential implications which prompt the recipient to provide a second part or alternatively to account for its absence, as in the following sequence.

#### Extract 1.5

- C: Yes can you tell me please if air ukay three ni:nety is coming in at fifteen twenty five still
- A: I'm sorry we're british airways (we) don't handle air ukay

(Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998, p. 249)

It now needs to be understood that the principles which underlie this straightforward analysis of adjacency pairs are the same ones which are used in much larger and more complex sequences; we will see in Chapter 5 that they underlie the analysis of interaction in the L2 classroom as well. The principles are as follows. A first action is analysed as projecting the production of a relevant next action by next speaker. If the relevant next action occurs next turn, it is treated in a seen but unnoticed fashion by first speaker as norms have been adhered to. The relevant action may not occur next turn but its noticeable absence may be accounted for (as in extract 1.5 above) by next speaker. However, if the next action is not produced by next speaker and no account is provided, this absence can be treated as noticeable, accountable and sanctionable by next speaker. The longer it is absent, the more sanctionable it becomes. So in extracts 1.3 and 1.4 any further silences on the parts of B and Mother might, for example, result in the throwing of an object (in the case of A) or a tantrum (in the case of Child). It is perfectly possible for speakers to deviate from norms, but listeners may negatively evaluate these observable behaviours and take sanctions against them.

Following a first turn, the interaction continues sequentially, with the second speaker's action creating expectations for subsequent speakers and so on. Moving on to the third turn, this displays an analysis of the second speaker's turn, so second speaker is able to determine how their turn has been interpreted. So the essence of CA is the concept of action sequences or sequence organisation, which has been exemplified by the adjacency pair. However, interaction clearly does not consist of an endless succession of adjacency pairs. The point being made is nevertheless that interaction *is* always an action sequence in which "a turn's talk will be heard as directed to a prior turn's talk, unless special techniques are used to locate some other talk to which it is directed." (Sacks et al., 1974, p. 728).

The adjacency pair has been used as an example of a generic phenomenon, namely next-positioning and linked actions within sequence organisation. The adjacency pair is not only an action template with normative force, it is also a template for interpretation. Extrapolating from this, any first action in interaction is an action template which creates a normative expectation for a next action and a template for interpreting it. The second action displays an interpretation of the first action and itself creates an action and interpretational template for subsequent actions, and so on. This can also be termed the *next-turn proof procedure* (Sacks et al., 1974: 729) which is the basic tool which analysts can use to develop an emic perspective. The next turn, then, documents an analysis of the previous turn and displays this analysis not only to the other interactants, but also to us as analysts, providing us with a proof criterion and search procedure. This procedure can be traced back to the ethnomethodological principle of reflexivity which states that the same set of methods or procedures are responsible for both the production of actions/language and its interpretation.

We can now see that this is reflexive on further levels. Sequence organisation is the mechanism by which interactants are able to make their utterances comprehensible and by which co- interactants are able to interpret them. However, it is also the mechanism by which analysts are able to analyse the course of the

interaction, using data which are publicly available. This does not mean, however, that we gain a direct window into what interactants “really mean” or their cognitive state<sup>15</sup>. We are rather gaining a direct window into how social actors perform a series of related social actions via the medium of language and into the progress of their *intersubjectivity*. Intersubjectivity is mutual understanding or interpersonal alignment and one of the key objectives of CA is to explicate how we are able to achieve a shared understanding of each other’s actions. The CA perspective is that we are able to orientate ourselves by normative reference to interactional organisations. Adjacency pairs (and sequence organisation) are therefore called the building blocks of intersubjectivity because interactants use them to display to one another their understanding of each others' turns and this permits analysts to follow the progress of their intersubjectivity.

#### Extract 1.6

- 1       A:     where’s Bill?  
2       J:     there’s a yellow VW outside Sue’s house

(Levinson, 1983, p. 102)

The production of a first turn provides an interpretative basis for first speaker to interpret the next speaker's actions. Here the second part is interpreted as a tentative answer to A’s question rather than an unconnected observation. However, it can be interpreted in this way solely by virtue of its sequential location after the first part of an adjacency pair. Perhaps CA's major contribution to pragmatics is that utterances derive much of their pragmatic force from their sequential location and through their relationship to the interactional organisations uncovered by CA. A typical "linguistic" misunderstanding of adjacency pairs is that they are part of a descriptivist system of units and rules which are etically specifiable. For example, Burns (2001, p. 134) suggests that "A weakness of CA resides in the fact that we still do not have precise ways of recognising adjacency pairs."

#### *Preference Organisation*

At this point we will introduce the notion of preference, which issues from the organisation of the adjacency pair. The concept has been frequently misunderstood, as Boyle (2000a) demonstrates. It should be clear to readers who have followed the argument so far that this is *not* related to the notion of liking or wanting to do something, but rather involves issues of affiliation and disaffiliation, of seeing, noticeability, accountability and sanctionability in relation to social actions and hence the concept derives directly from ethnomethodological principles. From this perspective, interaction should be understood as a business primarily of social actors aiming to achieve social goals (rather than engaged in the production of language) with the interaction rationally organised to help actors to achieve those goals. Next-positioning is the major means by which speakers can exert influence over the actions of their interactional partners and the institutionalised norm is for interaction to be affiliative, i.e. to achieve reciprocity of perspectives and to enable social actors to achieve their goals.

As Heritage (1984b, p. 265) puts it, "... there is a 'bias' intrinsic to many aspects of the organisation of talk which is generally favourable to the maintenance of

bonds of solidarity between actors and which promotes the avoidance of conflict." This is similar in concept to Grice's (1975) co-operative principle. This should be no surprise in terms of the "rational" design of interaction, in that the underlying ethnomethodological principles such as reflexivity, reciprocity of perspectives and the documentary method of interpretation are strongly affiliative. This structural bias manifests itself in preference organisation. For many adjacency pairs there are alternative second parts, so an invitation may be answered by an acceptance (preferred action) or a rejection (dispreferred action). These two options are performed in different ways (Pomerantz, 1984). Preferred actions are normally delivered without hesitation or delay at the start of the response turn, as in the extract below.

#### Extract 1.7

- 1        Child:            could you .hh could you put on the light for my .hh room  
2        Father:            yep

(Levinson, 1983, p. 307)

Dispreferred responses are generally accompanied by hesitation and delay and are often prefaced by markers such as *well* or *uh* as well as by positive comments and appreciations, e.g., "You're very kind". They are frequently mitigated in some way and accounted for by an explanation or excuse of some kind. A's turn in the extract below exemplifies all of the above-mentioned phenomena.

#### Extract 1.8

- 1:        B:            uh if you'd care to come over and visit a little while this morning  
2:                    I'll give you a cup of coffee.  
3:        A:            hehh well that's awfully sweet of you, I don't think I can make it  
4:                    this morning. hh uhm I'm running an ad in the paper and -and uh I  
5:                    have to stay near the phone.

(Atkinson and Drew, 1979, p. 58)

As Heritage (1984b, p. 269) demonstrates, the preferred responses to actions are *affiliative* and conducive to social solidarity, whereas dispreferred responses are *disaffiliative*. This does not mean that the function of agreement is always preferred. In the case of self-deprecating first turns (e.g. "God I'm stupid") the preferred response is disagreement, for example. At this point we need to refer back to our previous discussion of ethnomethodology. The preferred response is the one which follows the established norms, is socially affiliative and promotes reciprocity of perspectives. So an acceptance to an invitation follows the norms, is the default way of behaving and is socially affiliative and hence is "seen but unnoticed". The seen but unnoticed route is that which is overwhelmingly used to accomplish everyday actions. A refusal of an invitation is disaffiliative, does not follow the norms and hence is dispreferred. This means that it is noticeable and accountable, which is the reason why dispreferred actions are so frequently accompanied by accounts and excuses. However, if the dispreferred action is packaged so as to minimise the degree of disaffiliation and conflict (see the discussion of invitation rejections below) then it is

not normally sanctionable. By contrast, providing an immediate, bald and unmitigated *no* as a reply to an invitation will be treated as sanctionable because it is failing to provide an account and making no attempt to minimise the degree of disaffiliation. The basic organisation of preference is summarised in the figure below from Boyle (2000a).




Figure 1. The structure of preference. Boyle, 2000a, p. 590. Reprinted with permission from Elsevier.

So with the preferred pathway (acceptance in this case), no account is necessary, as the norms are being followed. With the noticeable and accountable but not sanctionable pathway, (rejection with mitigation and an account in this case) an account is provided and so affiliation is not threatened and sanctions unnecessary. With the noticeable, accountable and sanctionable pathway, (immediate, bald, unmitigated rejection) the dispreferred action has been performed without an account so disaffiliation has occurred and sanctions or reprisals become relevant, e.g. no more invitations for him!

We are now in a position to move on to the rational design of preferred and dispreferred seconds and attempt to explain why it is that the two types of turn are designed in different ways, with accounts and delays built into dispreferred turns. A preferred second is the seen but unnoticed or default response and is performed immediately as there is nothing to hold the interaction up and the actors can move onto the next action. As Heritage (1984b, p. 270-273) notes, invitations are overwhelmingly rejected on the basis of inability (e.g. prior engagement) rather than unwillingness. An inability account has a “no fault” quality which is affiliative, does not threaten face<sup>16</sup> and therefore minimises the degree of disaffiliation inherent in carrying out a dispreferred action. As far as the use of delays and markers such as *well* and *uh* are concerned, they are rationally linked to the production of accounts in that they allow time for recipients to think of accounts and excuses to mitigate the dispreferred action. Moreover, they allow time for the first speaker to perform two affiliative actions which could minimise the disaffiliation or loss of face caused by a rejection. The first of these is to modify the invitation into a more acceptable form as in line 5 of the extract below.



### Extract 1.8

- 1       A       oh I was gonna sa:y if you wanted to:;= .hh you could meet me  
2               at UCB and I could show you some of the other things on  
3               the compu:ter  
4               (.)  
5   → A:       maybe even teach you how to program Ba:sic or something. .hhh

(Davidson, 1984)

The second is to allow the first speaker to “help” with the production of the rejection in some way, as in the extract below, which invites the production of an account or excuse.

### Extract 1.9

- E:               wanna come down have a bite of lunch with me?= I've got some beer  
                  and stuff  
                  (0.3)  
N:               well you're real sweet hon uhm  
                  (0.1)  
E:   →       or do you have something else

(Atkinson and Drew, 1979, p. 253)

Delay, then, provides time for both interactants to take further measures to minimise the degree of disaffiliation caused by a dispreferred second turn. I will briefly mention pre-sequences, which are closely linked to the concepts of the adjacency pair and preference.

### Extract 1.10

- 1       A:       whatcha doin?  
2       B:       nothin'  
3       A:       wanna drink?

(Atkinson and Drew, 1979, p. 253)

Line 1 can be seen as a preliminary sequence which determines whether B is in principle amenable to an invitation. From the point of view of preference, it minimises the likelihood that a dispreferred rejection will be produced on receipt of an invitation and is therefore affiliative. Pre-sequences are pairs which function as preparation for a future pair, e.g. pre-closings, pre-announcements, pre-questions, pre-requests. They often function in the way illustrated above to pre-empt the need for the production of a dispreferred action.

So far I have focussed on the organisation of sequence, introducing the adjacency pair as an example of sequence organisation. Preference organisation explains the structural bias manifest in the alternative second parts of adjacency pairs. The next section explains how turn-taking is organised within sequences.

## Turn-taking

The exchange of turns is obviously characteristic of ordinary conversation; what is not so obvious is how it is accomplished so efficiently. Less than 5% of speech (in most contexts) is delivered with overlap, and gaps between speakers are generally measured in tenths of a second. Non-verbal communication cannot explain this, since telephone conversations are actually accomplished with more precise timing than face-to-face conversation (Levinson, 1983, p. 296). The system for turn-taking must be extremely robust, since it works whoever or however many people are speaking and whatever the length or topic of the conversation is. The following is a simplified version of Sacks et al.'s seminal (1974) account of the organisation of turn taking. There is a mechanism governing turn-taking which is termed a local management system; this means that decisions can be made by the participants, rather than having the turns allocated in advance (pre-allocated), as is the case in a courtroom.

There is a set of norms with options which the participants can select. The basis of the system is *turn-constructive units* or TCUs, units which can be sentences, clauses or words. I will discuss the nature of TCUs in detail below. Listeners project, then, when a speaker is going to finish a turn, and the point at which speaker change may occur is known as the *transition relevance place* or TRP. At a TRP the norms governing transition of speakers come into play; the speakers may change at that point, but they do not necessarily do so. These norms apply at the first TRP of any turn:

- a) If current speaker selects the next speaker in the current turn, then the current speaker must stop speaking and the next speaker must speak.
- b) If the current speaker does not select a next speaker, then any other participant may select themselves as next speaker: the first person to speak at the TRP gains rights to the next turn.
- c) If the current speaker has not selected a next speaker, and if no other participant self-selects as per section b), then the current speaker may (but need not) continue. The procedure then loops or recycles until the end of the conversation, for which there are of course further norms.

Schegloff (2000a) discusses the organisation of overlap and introduces an overlap resolution device as a component of the organisation of turn-taking. Overlap occurs for a number of reasons and in a number of ways. As we saw with sequence organisation, the system of turn-taking is normative, so speakers may choose to perform specific social actions “by reference to one-party-at-a-time, even though they are realized through designedly simultaneous talk.” (Schegloff 2000a, p. 48).

### Extract 1.11

- A: why don't you come up and see me some[ times  
B: [ I would like to

(Atkinson & Drew, 1979, p. 58)

It is quite common for preferred, affiliative second turns such as acceptance of an invitation or agreement (as in the extract above) to be undertaken in

overlap before the transition relevance point. In these cases it is precisely by normative reference to the norms of turn-taking and the TRP that interactants index their degree of enthusiasm for the proposal and affiliation to their partner.

Extract 1.12

- C: we:ll I wrote what I thought was a a-a  
rea:son[ able explanatio:n  
F: [ I: think it was a very rude le:tter.

(Levinson, 1983, p. 299)

In the above extract, F begins his/her turn in the middle of *reasonable*. This cannot be considered a TRP, so it must be an interruption. This is confirmed by the disaffiliative social action embodied in F's turn, which directly contradicts first speaker and the bald linguistic formatting, with no attempt at mitigation. This extract illustrates that the norms of turn-taking can be broken; doing so has consequences for the progress of the interaction and social relations. Overlap, then, may be designedly used to intensify the affiliative or disaffiliative nature of particular social actions. However, it is also common to find overlap occurring at TRPs in accordance with the norms of turn-taking.

Extract 1.13

- D: he's got to talk to someone (very sor) supportive way  
towards you (.)  
A: [ Greg's (got wha-)]  
G: [ think you sh-] think you should have one to: hold him

(Atkinson and Drew, 1979, p. 44)

In this case A and G make a competing first start at the TRP, following the norms. A leaves the floor to G, who then repeats the start of his/her turn (think you) as the other participants may not have heard it during the period of overlap.

Extract 1.14

- B: I ordered some paint from you uh a couple  
of weeks ago some vermilion  
A: yuh  
B: and I wanted to order some more the name's Boyd  
A: → yes [ how many tubes would you like sir  
B: → [ an-

(Levinson, 1983, p. 305)

Here, B starts a turn at a possible TRP, in that A's *yes* is a complete TCU and the turn could end at this point. When the overlap indicates that current speaker is in fact continuing, B follows the norms by ceding the turn.

### Extract 1.15

(Sacks et al., 1974)

### Extract 1.16

20

(Schegloff, 1996, p. 75)

However, in extract 1.16 line 3, we can see that Tony's turn consists of a single TCU of a single word. Yet this single word not only constitutes an entire turn, but it also performs three kinds of sequential work in the past, present and future. This is possible because interactants orient to a normative sequential framework, a holistic framework consisting of the interlocking organisations of turn-taking, sequence, preference and repair. Since the normative expectation is that a turn will perform these three kinds of sequential work, Tony can design his turn so that a single word is capable of doing so and Marsha can interpret it as doing so; *this is the principle of reflexivity in action*. The evidence that the participants are actually orienting to the system described is in the next-turn proof procedure. Marsha analyses Tony's turn as commenting retrospectively on what happened to her car, as performing a new social action of confirming understanding of Marsha's news by summarising the content in a new linguistic format and as providing a context for her to take the sequence further. She displays her understanding of the work performed by his turn in her subsequent turn (line 5) by repeating his turn with the same intonation and adding further information on the theft.

What is clear from the above discussion, then, is that TCUs are only analysable emically as social actions. They are quite heterogeneous in terms of linguistic form and do not correspond in any way to single linguistic categories. However they are packaged in terms of linguistic form, the point is that social actors are able to recognise them in interaction as complete social actions (as we can see in line 5) and hence are able to project when they are likely to end. According to Ford and Thompson (1996, p. 171), the features of a turn which enable a speaker to project the end of a prior turn "must include not only syntactic cues but also intonational features as well as some notion of pragmatic or action completion... these three types of cues converge to a great extent to define transition relevance places in conversations, places to which conversationalists orient in sequencing their turns."

So we can see that CA is not a system of etically specifiable units and rules to be followed in a regulative sense, like, for example, rules for the construction of a grammatically correct sentence. Much confusion may have arisen because Sacks et al.'s early works did use the terms *unit* and *rule* without explicating the difference between the CA and linguistic understandings of such terms. This may then have led to the belief that CA organisations were systems of units and rules in the descriptivist linguistic sense. However, CA does not have an etically specifiable unit of analysis in the sense in which this is understood in linguistics; it would be preferable to say that CA has an emic analytical focus on the sequence. In descriptivist linguistics it makes perfect sense to analyse a word or sentence in isolation. In CA, by contrast, it does not make any sense to analyse the turn *stolen* in extract 1.16 in isolation. Trying to identify the TCU or the turn as a unit of analysis misses the point; *stolen* is a social action embedded in a sequential environment. So in CA we are dealing with a holistic system of analysis and this is the case because the interactants are using the same holistic system of analysis themselves, as is made clear by Hutchby and Wooffitt.

It is important to realise that it is not part of the conversation analyst's aim to define ... what a turn-construction unit is, as a linguist for instance may want to define what a sentence is. Conversation analysts cannot take a prescriptive stance on this question, because what a turn-construction unit consists of in any situated stretch of talk is a members' problem. That

is, such a unit is essentially anything out of which a legitimate turn has recognizably - for the participants - been built. (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998, p. 48)

This is clearly a very different approach to describing and analysing language to those used in linguistics. So the fundamental difference is that linguists attempt etic specifications of aspects of language itself whereas CA practitioners attempt emic analysis of how social actions are carried out by means of language. Nonetheless, participants in conversation clearly do not have great difficulty in identifying TCUs and projecting TRPs (i.e., in designing and recognising social actions) since, as already noted, exchange of turns is generally accomplished very efficiently.

The organisations of the adjacency pair, preference and turn-taking constitute the structural organisation of talk. However, the fourth element, repair, comes into play whenever there are problems in the accomplishment of talk.

### *Repair*

Repair may be defined as the treatment of trouble occurring in interactive language use. Trouble is anything which the participants judge is impeding their communication and a repairable item is one which constitutes trouble for the participants. Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks (1997, p. 363) point out that “nothing is, in principle, excludable from the class ‘repairable’”. From the ethnomethodological perspective it is a vital mechanism for the maintenance of reciprocity of perspectives and intersubjectivity. It is of particular importance for L2 learners and teachers to understand how breakdowns in communication and misunderstandings are repaired and we will see in Chapter 4 that repair in the L2 classroom tends to carry a heavier load than in other settings. It is important to distinguish self-initiated repair (I prompt repair of my mistake) from other-initiated repair (somebody else notices my mistake and initiates repair). Self-repair (I correct myself) must also be distinguished from other-repair (somebody corrects my mistake). There are therefore normally four repair trajectories:

#### *1. Self-initiated self-repair*

##### Extract 1.17

A: had to put new gaskets on the oil pan to stop-stop the leak

(Levinson, 1983, p. 360)

#### *2. Self-initiated other-repair*

##### Extract 1.18

B: he had dis uh Mistuh W-m whatever k- I can't think of his first name, Watts on, the one that wrote [ that piece

A: [ Dan Watts

(Schegloff et al., 1977, p. 364)

### 3. Other-initiated self-repair

#### Extract 1.19

- A: hey the first time they stopped me from selling cigarettes was this morning.  
(1.0)  
B: → from selling cigarettes?  
A: → from buying cigarettes.

(Schegloff et al., 1977, p. 370)

### 4. Other-initiated other-repair

#### Extract 1.20

- C: erm I'm just checking is that (.) right you know (0.5) I d- I don't know  
his flight number and [ I'm not sure  
A: [ (whi-)  
C: whether he's coming in to channel four eh:  
(.)  
A: → terminal four  
C: yeah

(Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998, p. 63)

Now there is a clear preference structure in the organisation of repair which corresponds with the above listing. This is that self-initiated self-repair is most preferred and other-initiated other-repair least preferred. This order also corresponds with frequency of usage in normal conversation, with other-initiated other-repair being rare<sup>17</sup>. There are two kinds of evidence for the preference for self-repair. The first is the inherent structural bias, with the first two opportunities located in the speaker's own turn – during the same turn-constructional unit and at the next transition relevance place. According to Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998, p. 66) "there are various ways in which turns are designed to facilitate self-repair, or display the speaker's sensitivity to the appropriateness of self-repair and the (possible) impropriety of other-repair." In the next two extracts we can see interactants making very different normative usage of the preference system for repair with very different outcomes.

#### Extract 1.21

- 1 L: but y'know single beds'r awfully thin to sleep on.  
2 S: what?  
3 L: single beds. [ they're-  
4 E: [ y'mean narrow?  
5 L: they're awfully narrow yeah.

(Schegloff et al., 1977, p. 378)

In extract 1.21 we can see the other speakers (S and E) moving down the preference structure in an attempt to repair the problem, which is that L has used a lexical item (*thin*) which does not collocate with *bed*. Since L does not appear to have noticed this problem in that there is no attempt at self-repair, in line 2 S uses the next-preferred option, namely other-initiation of self-repair. However, S uses an ‘open’(Drew, 1997) next-turn repair initiator (what?) which means that L does not appear to be able to locate the precise problem and seems in line 3 to be starting to repeat the whole of the initial utterance. Therefore, the other speakers are entitled to move further down the preference organisation and use other-initiated other-repair in line 4. However, note that the repair form is mitigated and shows affiliation as it is designed as a question. Framing a correction as a question or confirmation check and offering an alternative is a useful strategy as it in effect gives first speaker the opportunity the opportunity to self-repair in the next turn. It is an affiliative action in that it portrays second speaker as orienting to and attempting to help first speaker. This mitigation of repair occurs in the L2 classroom as well as ordinary conversations. Other means of mitigation may include the use of jokes and markers such as *I think*. Since S and E have moved gradually down the preference organisation and mitigated the other-initiated other-repair, L accepts and confirms uptake of the repair in line 5.

#### Extract 1.22

- 1     A:   ... had to put new gaskets on the oil pan to stop-stop the  
2           leak, an' then I put- and then-  
3     R:   that was a gas leak.  
4     A:   it was an oil leak buddy.  
5     B:   't's a gas leak.  
6     A:   it's an oil leak.  
      ((dispute continues for many turns))

(Levinson, 1983, p. 360)

By contrast, in extract 1.22 line 3, R immediately conducts other-initiated other-repair (i.e. the least preferred option) without any attempt to start higher up the preference organisation. Also note that there is no attempt at all at mitigation in the linguistic design (i.e. a bald statement) and in terms of an social action it is a flat contradiction. In line 4 we can see that A interprets this as a face-threatening, disaffiliative action in that A conducts unmitigated other-initiated other-repair on R's turn; it is hence no surprise to find the dispute continuing for many turns. What we can see in the analysis of the above two extracts is that preference organisation must not be seen as a system of “rules” which must be followed; clearly in extract 1.22 the norms are not being followed. However, the point is that the normative preference system acts as an action template or point of reference which enables participants to display their level of affiliation to each other and to interpret each other's actions. In line 3 R displays a lack of affiliation with A's perspective precisely by going directly to the least preferred option. A's response in line 4 demonstrates that A has interpreted this action, by reference to the preference organisation, as a display of complete disaffiliation and has therefore “retaliated” by a similar display of disaffiliation.



In section 1.6 we have characterised the different types of interactional organisation which work together in complementary fashion to create an architecture of intersubjectivity (Heritage 1984b, p. 254). They function as action templates or points of reference which interactants may use to orientate themselves in the pursuit of mutual understanding. A vital point is that these interactional organisations are *not* to be understood as rules, units or coding schemes in the sense in which these would be understood in a descriptivist linguistic paradigm. Rather, they are a set of normative resources which interactants make use of to display the meaning of their social actions to their partners and to interpret their partners' actions:

In its first phase CA's conceptual apparatus was developed in its originators' struggle with the data, while in its second phase this apparatus is generally available as an established repertoire...The danger in this situation is that less talented, insightful or sensitive practitioners may be tempted to 'apply' the established concepts in a mechanistic fashion, as 'coding instruments'... In other words, the temptation is to use CA's previously established concepts and findings as law-like or even 'causal' rules, whereas one should ... see them as descriptions of possible normative orientations of participants, available for various usages as they see fit. (ten Have, 1999, p. 41)

*Topic* is a central concept in the analysis of talk and is co-constructed by participants during the course of the talk. However, it is not an interactional organisation and is not part of the context-free architecture of talk. Unlike the organisations of adjacency pairs and turn-taking, topic is not oriented to normatively. Topic is not treated at all in recent introductions to CA such as ten Have (1999) or Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998). However, it is extensively discussed by Sacks (1992).

## 1.7 CA Procedures

Having reviewed the basic components of interactional organisation, I will now explicate how these are used in the procedures of CA analysis. The first stage of CA analysis has been described as *unmotivated looking* or being open to discovering patterns or phenomena. Psathas (1995, pp. 24-25) describes the term unmotivated looking as a paradox "since looking is motivated or there would be no looking being done in the first place." So what is really meant is being open to discovering new phenomena rather than searching the data with preconceptions or hypotheses. For example, in my research in L2 classrooms (reported in section **Error! Reference source not found.**) the identification of teachers' avoidance of bald and unmitigated *no* in form and accuracy contexts emerged as a phenomenon from unmotivated looking rather than from a preconception that this was an issue which I should focus on. Having identified a candidate phenomenon, the next phase is normally an inductive search through a database to establish a collection of instances of the phenomenon. However, single case analysis can also be undertaken (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998, pp. 120-130).

After an inductive database search has been carried out, the next step is to establish regularities and patterns in relation to occurrences of the phenomenon and to show that these regularities are methodically produced and oriented to by the participants as normative organizations of action (Heritage, 1988, p. 131). In order to explicate the emic logic or rational organisation of the pattern uncovered, the next

step is detailed analysis of single instances of the phenomenon. Deviant cases are seen to be particularly revealing since, as Heritage (1995, p. 399) puts it, they often serve to demonstrate the normativity of practices. Finally a more generalised account is produced of how the phenomenon relates to the broader matrix of interaction. For reasons of space we will not be illustrating inductive search procedures here, but in section 6.5 I briefly review an example from Schegloff (1968). Further examples may be found in Drew (1987), Heritage (1984a) and Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998).

At this point is important to understand that what CA practitioners identify as a phenomenon is primarily an example of social action and they are not interested in it as a linguistic object as such. The phenomenon may indeed be a “superficially linguistic” item such as the marker *oh* (Heritage, 1984a) or a syntactical construction, such as the “you say X ... what about Y” pattern (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998, pp. 104-109). However, they may be social actions identifiable by sequential placement, such as Drew's (1987) study of po-faced reactions to teases. The point to be made is that it is perfectly possible for researchers who are only interested in linguistic items to attempt to use CA to investigate such a “superficially linguistic” phenomenon in interaction. However, such an attempt would tend to reveal a lack of a conversation analytic mentality and would therefore tend to produce superficial results. There are a number of accounts of the procedures to be followed in CA analysis: Drew, 1994; Psathas, 1995; Ten Have, 1999. The following account is a synthesis of the above accounts. This is an account of a single case analysis<sup>18</sup> focussing on a single data extract. We start the account after recording, transcription and unmotivated looking have taken place and after we have identified a single extract to focus on.

- 1) Locate an action sequence or sequences;
- 2) Characterise the actions in the sequence or sequences. An action sequence can be as short as an adjacency pair or last for hours. We are looking for a first speaker to initiate an action which is responded to in some way by a second speaker. This ends when the speakers move to perform a different action or series of actions. The idea of characterising the actions in the sequence may be termed form-function matching, speech act analysis or Discourse Analysis (DA) in Levinson's (1983) terms. So we may, for example, identify a sequence in which an offer is made and then rejected or a complex sequence of embedded question and answer adjacency pairs (e.g. Levinson, 1983, p. 305). It should be noted here that form-function analysis has always been an integral part of CA (even in Sack's first lecture) and that DA is in effect an integral part of CA (see section **Error! Reference source not found.**). However, a major difference is that CA reveals and portrays the fact that utterances often perform several actions simultaneously and are specifically designed to do so (Levinson, 1983, p. 311) so a CA analysis will portray the multiplexity of actions performed by an utterance whereas a DA analysis normally “translates” an utterance into a single function.
- 3) Examine the action sequence(s) in terms of the organisation of turn-taking, focussing especially on any disturbances in the working of the system.
- 4) Examine the action sequence(s) in terms of sequence organisation. Here we are looking at adjacency pairs and preference organisation but more widely at any action undertaken in response to other actions.
- 5) Examine the action sequence(s) in terms of the organisation of repair.
- 6) Examine how the speakers package their actions in terms of the actual linguistic forms which they select from the alternatives available and consider the significance of these. We are in effect returning here to form-function analysis,

but this time we are focussing on the forms which are used to manifest the functions. Going back to extracts 1.3 and 1.4, for example, we noted there that actors repeated questions in increasingly short and curt forms and that this displayed a change in orientation.

7) Uncover any roles, identities or relationships which emerge in the details of the interaction. As noted in section 1.5, CA normally tries to avoid making (premature) reference to background information such as institutional setting, personal details (age, gender etc.) until after the initial analysis. This is so it can be established which particulars are demonstrably relevant to the actors in the interaction i.e. that these particulars are manifest *in some way* in the details of the interaction; this may take many different forms; see section 1.8 below. Stages 1-7 would be followed whether one were analysing ordinary conversation or institutional interaction. In the case of institutional interaction, one would move from Stage 7 onto other issues, as will be seen in section **Error! Reference source not found.**

8) Having completed a preliminary analysis which portrays the interactional organisation and the participants' orientations, an attempt is now made to locate this particular sequence within a bigger picture. Of course, how this is done depends on what has been uncovered in the analysis. However, we are looking for a rational specification of the sequence which can uncover its emic logic and the machinery which produced it and which places it in a wider matrix of interaction; an example of this is provided in chapter 5. What we see in CA methodology is constant, reflexive interaction between the specific instance and the underlying machinery. So specific episodes are analysed by reference to types of interactional organisation (adjacency pairs, etc.) whilst particular instances help us to further elaborate the underlying machinery.

## 1.8 *Attitude to Context*

CA has a dynamic, complex, highly empirical perspective on context<sup>19</sup>. The basic aim is to establish an emic perspective, i.e. to determine which elements of context are relevant to the interactants at any point in the interaction. The perspective is also an active one in which participants talk a context into being. The perspective is dynamic in that, as Heritage (1984b, p. 242) puts it, "The context of a next action is repeatedly renewed with every current action" and is transformable at any moment. A basic assumption of CA is that contributions to interaction are *context-shaped* and *context-renewing*. Contributions are context-shaped in that they cannot be adequately understood except by reference to the sequential environment in which they occur and in which the participants design them to occur. Contributions are context-renewing in that they create a sequential environment or template in which a next contribution will occur. This view of utterances as context-shaped and context-renewing can be traced back to the ethnomethodological principle of reflexivity. The principle of indexicality of utterances is clearly incorporated in the CA view of context and utterances clearly document the participants' understanding of context.

CA sees the underlying machinery which generates interaction as being both context-free and context-sensitive: The structural organisations (e.g. turn-taking) can be seen as the context-free resources in that their organisation can be specified as a series of norms in isolation from any specific instance of interaction. Nonetheless, the application of these organisations is context-sensitive in that interactants use the organisation of (for example) turn-taking to display their understanding of context. So

professionals and lay clients may talk an institutional context into being through the professional taking control of the turn-taking system; we understand this by reference to the context-free norms. By tracing how the context-free resources are employed and manifested locally in a context-sensitive manner, we are able to uncover the underlying machinery. As Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998, p. 36) put it, “The aim of conversation analysis ... is to explicate the structural organization of talk in interaction at this interface between context-free resources and their context-sensitive applications.” Extract 1.24 exemplifies how this is undertaken.

CA employs a highly empirical, bottom-up approach to the specification of context. According to Schegloff (1987, p. 221), much CA work “can be seen as an extended effort to elaborate just what a context is and what its explication or description might entail.” Evidence for the characterisation of a context has to derive primarily from the orientations of the participants as documented in the details of the interactional data rather than from a description of the physical setting or the participants. The key to understanding why CA insists on being so tightly empirical is that the aim is to develop an emic perspective on how the participants display to each other their understanding of the context. Clearly this cannot be achieved by analysts etically deciding which aspects of context *they* think are relevant, particularly as there are an infinite number of potentially relevant contextual details which could be invoked. We can see an example of how contextual features can become relevant in the following extract.

#### Extract 1.23

407 L10: oh I see (.) I see the chinese is uh (.) sanku  
 408 (0.6-0.9)  
 409 L11: unh?  
 410 L10: sanku  
 411 (.)  
 412 L9: what  
 413 L10: c [ orals  
 414 L11: [ corals  
 415 L9: corals oh okay

(Markee, 2000, p. 27)

In this case L10's and L11's ethnic/linguistic identity as Chinese native speakers (L9 is from a different ethnic/linguistic background) becomes available and relevant to CA analysis since this is made relevant in the details of the interaction through L10 producing the Chinese translation of ‘corals’ and L10 and L11 then translating it back into English.

The final aspect to the complex CA perspective on context is that sequences of actions are seen as a major part of what we mean by context and that “modes of interactional organisation might themselves be treated as contexts” (Schegloff, 1987, p. 221). This point will be illustrated in the discussion of the extract below, in which we conclude this section on context by demonstrating how all of these different elements cohere. Whereas static and monolithic approaches to discourse regard institutional context as something given, fixed and located in the background, CA adopts a dynamic view of context as endogenous to the talk, “showing that the

participants build the context of their talk in and through their talk.” (Heritage, 1997, p. 164).

#### Extract 1.24

- 11 Dr F: doctor Hollmann told me something like  
12 you were running across the street not so  
13 completely dressed or something like that,  
14 Ms B: (h)yes: that's:- I am a child of God;=  
15 I am his child;  
16 (.)  
17 Ms B: does a- does=-  
18 =do you have children doctor Fisch[er?  
19 Dr F: [yes:  
20 Ms B: yes what age,  
21 Dr F: uh around s-seven eight [ and eleven  
22 Ms B: [ yes and when they  
23 were small these children,  
24 Dr F: yes [ :,  
25 Ms B: [ didn't they sometimes run around naked  
26 [ because they don't yet - because they  
27 Dr F: [ t(hh) u(h)  
28 Ms B: don't (.) know that they must not do that. yes and in the same way:  
29 you have to see that in my relationship to God

(Bergmann, 1992, p. 149 (translated from German))

The above extract demonstrates why such a complex approach to context is necessary. A static, top-down, etic approach to context would work from the background contextual information regarding the psychiatrist, patient and the institutional setting (mental hospital). However, the extract demonstrates the need for a dynamic, empirical, emic, bottom-up approach rooted in the details of the interaction. Although the interaction starts off in lines 11-13 with the professional questioning the patient, the “context” is immediately transformed as the patient poses a number of questions to the professional (who answers them) in order to lead the professional (in a Socratic manner) to a new insight in lines 29 and 30. It is the interactional organisation which has fundamentally changed during the course of the dialogue and hence a significant element of the “context”, even though the background factors remain constant. This why CA proposes that organisations of the interaction can be treated as contexts and that the participants “talk contexts into being”. Ms B's contributions from line 18 are context-shaped in that they have to be understood in the context of the psychiatrist's previous turn, but they are context-renewing in that they talk a different context into being. The organisation of turn-taking and adjacency pairs are context-free resources and function as norms. It is by reference to these norms that we can understand that Ms B is subverting the previously established context through her use of the organisation of turn-taking and adjacency pairs in a context-sensitive way.



Readers who have followed the argument in this chapter, however, will realise that we need to see the turn-taking model as a constitutive norm which interactants make use of to display the meaning of their social actions to their partners and to interpret their partners' actions. First of all we will treat Cameron's point in general terms. It is indeed common for close friends, family and associates to use overlap and simultaneous speech and this may be significant social action, although this would have to be explicated on a case by case basis. As Schegloff (2000a, p. 48) puts it, "Specific action ... outcomes are co-constructed by reference to one-party-at-a-time, even though they are realized through designedly simultaneous talk." It is quite common for preferred second turns such as acceptance of an invitation or agreement (as in extract 1.25 above and also extract 1.26 below) to be undertaken in overlap before the TRP.

Extract 1.26

A: why don't you come up and see me some[ times  
B: [ I would like to

(Atkinson & Drew, 1979, p. 58)

The point is that it may be precisely by reference to the TRP and the norms of turn-taking that close friends and family index their degree of agreement and affiliation and talk a relationship of intimacy and a context of informality into being. In some cases it may be that the earlier one delivers the preferred action, the greater one's display of unquestioning support for and affiliation to one's partner. Similarly, it may be precisely by reference to the norms of turn-taking and to the TRP that we display disaffiliation and prefigure a dispreferred action, for example if B had left a very long silence before answering A.

However, the point of CA is to analyse data, so we will apply the fundamental CA questions to Cameron's data: why does overlap occur in extract 1.25 in exactly that way (i.e. in those linguistic forms) at exactly that point? The first thing we notice is that A extends her turn after the first transition relevance place (the first mention of Katie) and repeats the same basic social action. She twice presents an opinion about the relationship between the unnamed "she" and Katie, or proffers this as topic in Schegloff's (1996, p. 58) terms: "It is a recurrent feature of such sequences that two tries or proffers are put forward, each of which can be taken up and embraced or declined by its recipient". The next thing that we note is that it is not an exact repetition. The first opinion "she didn't like Katie" is uni-directional and rather stronger than the second opinion "she didn't get on with Katie" which presents the lack of social harmony as more of a two-way problem. At the first transition relevance place (the first mention of Katie), B could have performed some kind of agreement. However, as this is not forthcoming at that point, A extends the turn and repackages the same basic point in order to downgrade the degree of social disharmony implied. This creates an additional opportunity for B to give an affiliative response.

As Ford and Thompson (1996, p. 167) explain: "Turn extensions in our data are regularly geared towards ... creating or modifying relevance for another speaker's response. In pursuing recipient responses, speakers may ... soften some claim ... thus revising the context for agreement or disagreement." Note that B's action of agreement starts in overlap at precisely the earliest possible moment at which B can

recognise what A is about to say and recognise that it is a downgrade and therefore an assessment which she can agree with the second time round. We know that B has recognised what A was going to say at that moment because of the next-turn proof procedure. That is, B actually produces the same grammatical structure as A, even though they are talking in overlap. By withholding agreement at the first TRP, B has created a slight disaffiliation between herself and A. A then makes an affiliative action by modifying her opinion and creates a fresh opportunity for B to agree. As soon as B can recognise this, she displays the degree of her enthusiasm for agreeing with the modified opinion and hence for restoring her affiliation with A precisely by delivering the action at the earliest possible point in overlap. Why does B use exactly those linguistic forms? The *no* documents agreement. By adopting exactly the same linguistic forms as A, B again displays the degree of her agreement with A. This also points to another motivation for the overlap starting at that exact point. According to Lerner:

At times participants may speak in a fashion that reveals that they are aiming to simultaneously co-produce part or all of a turn-constructive unit more or less in unison with another participant, by recognizably attempting to do such things as match the words, voicing and tempo of the other speaker... Choral co-production can be employed by an addressed recipient of a turn to demonstrate agreement with what is being said. (Lerner, 2002, pp. 226 & 237).

Choral co-production, then, can be a powerful means of displaying the degree of one's empathy with another and in this case could only be accomplished by B starting her turn in overlap as early as possible. The two-line extract is also rather intriguing as it demonstrates how the interactants negotiate their degree of affiliation to each other at the same time as they are negotiating as topic the state of affiliation between two acquaintances.

The stated aim of Cameron's (2001) introduction to CA is to provide "a grounding in the practical techniques of (CA (among other approaches)) and how to apply them to real data." It is therefore disappointing that Cameron fails to analyse her data using a CA methodology and instead presents them as having "no obvious place in the model" of turn-taking (2001, p. 93). The degree of B's agreement is indexed by and documented by the timing of the overlap as well as by its linguistic formatting. In other words, the interactants perform their social actions *precisely by normative reference to the model of turn-taking*. The interactional organisations themselves are context-free, but the vital point is that participants employ these context-free organisations in a context-sensitive way to display their social actions. It is because the participants (and we as analysts) are able to identify the gap between the context-free model and its context-sensitive implementation that they (and we as analysts) are able to understand the social significance of the context-sensitive implementation. Cameron (2001) is representative of several short introductions to linguistic CA<sup>21</sup> and demonstrates how wide the gulf has now become between *linguistic CA* and ethnomethodological CA. Taking Cameron (2001) as the archetype, the typical features of introductions to linguistic CA are as follows:

- No representative examples of actual CA analysis are provided.
- There is no mention of any of the ethnomethodological principles which are the fundamentals of CA methodology.



- The reader is likely to form the impression that interactional organisations are the methodology of CA and are a system of units and rules to be applied etically in the same way as in a descriptivist linguistics approach.
- There is no indication that participants employ these context-free interactional organisations in a normative, context-sensitive way to display their social actions.
- Hence the reflexive connection between social action and language is entirely absent.

It is therefore no surprise that many linguistics students now believe *doing CA* to mean producing a detailed transcription and then merely identifying instances of turn-taking, adjacency pairs, preference and repair; there is description of superficial linguistic features rather than an analysis of social action. Linguistic CA is basically CA minus the methodology; a kind of coding scheme. Metaphorically, it presents the reader with a Porsche which has had a lawn-mower engine put in it instead. It may have the same name badge and bodywork and crawl forward in the same direction after a fashion, but the power is no longer there.

We should consider whether there is any fundamental objection to having two alternative versions of CA. In my view there is no crucial problem provided that the two versions are separated, defined and named differently. Linguists will no doubt continue to find it useful to etically employ the interactional organisations as a coding scheme in a descriptivist linguistic paradigm. Provided that it is recognised that this is linguistic CA and is different to doing CA analysis, I cannot see any fundamental objection. This separation and re-naming would avoid the current problem which does seem to me to be very serious. This is the current blurring between the two versions which gives the impression to many linguists that ethnomethodological CA is also an underpowered, etic coding scheme. So, for example, we saw above that Cameron's introduction to CA suggests that CA is unable to handle straightforward data, whereas the ethnomethodological version is perfectly capable of doing so. The term 'CA' should be reserved for the original ethnomethodological version and 'linguistic CA' for the linguistic version. A further problem caused by the current blurred situation is that sociological CA practitioners occasionally express a degree of frustration with a common belief among linguists that they understand CA when what they have actually encountered is the linguistic version. It is therefore possible that formalising a separation between the two versions would lead to greater clarity and understanding between all parties involved.

In this chapter I have introduced the fundamentals of CA methodology in relation to ordinary conversation. In Chapter 2, I introduce CA methodology in relation to institutional discourse in general and in Chapters 3 to 6, CA is applied to L2 classroom interaction in particular. In chapter 7 we will revisit CA as a social science research methodology in relation to issues such as validity, reliability, generalisability, quantification, and triangulation.

A number of typical criticisms of CA are that it refuses to use available theories of human conduct, is unwilling to invoke "obvious" background contextual features and is obsessed with "trivial" detail. The "units of analysis" are alleged to be unclear and unreliable and it is said that interactants often do not follow the "rules" specified by CA. It is hoped that this chapter has clarified the CA position in relation to all of these issues and has explained the coherent rationale underlying CA methodology.

In this chapter I have illustrated the basic principles of Conversation Analysis (CA) using extracts from ordinary conversation. The chapter explained the relationship between ethnomethodology and CA, outlining five fundamental principles which underlie ethnomethodology and hence CA. After outlining the aims and principles of CA, I introduced the interactional organisations of sequence (adjacency pairs), preference, turn-taking and repair. I then explained the typical analytical procedures followed in CA and introduced the CA perspective on context. The chapter concluded with the argument that a “linguistic” version of CA has diverged from ethnomethodological CA.

<sup>1</sup> The terms *language classroom* and *L2 classroom* refer to any classrooms in which languages other than the mother tongue of the students is taught.

<sup>2</sup> See Heritage (1984b).

<sup>3</sup> See, however, Levinson (1983).

<sup>4</sup> The discussion is based on Heritage (1984b); Boyle (1997); Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998); Ten Have (1999).

<sup>5</sup> Parsons (1937).

<sup>6</sup> These principles originate in Boyle (1997); Garfinkel (1967); Heritage (1984b).

<sup>7</sup> A schema is a hypothetical mental framework for portraying memorised generic concepts. See Cook (1989, p. 69). See section 6.3 for the CA perspective on socially distributed cognition. It is important to note that CA does not ‘psychologise’ about participants’ cognitive states nor discuss structures such as schemata; here I am merely pointing to a similarity.

<sup>8</sup> In section 1.8 we noted that ethnographic or contextual information could only be invoked in the analysis if it was evident in the details of the interaction that the participants were orienting to it. However, many extracts in this monograph start with ethnographic or contextual information. Indeed, this is common practice in relation to institutional discourse, with the majority of chapters in Drew and Heritage (1992) starting with some kind of contextual information. The apparent contradiction can be explained by the difference between process and product. The process is that described in section 1.8. However, in order to turn technical CA analyses into publishable work, the analyses need to be made readable and to follow standard academic conventions. Therefore, it is almost always necessary for the published work ‘product’ to start by supplying information necessary to the reader and to employ terms in the transcript such as ‘teacher’, ‘judge’ etc.

<sup>9</sup> Taking sanctions means expressing righteous hostility on a social level, e.g., by snubbing someone.

<sup>10</sup> See section 6.3 for a discussion of the CA perspective on socially distributed cognition.

<sup>11</sup> Although gaze and non-verbal communication can be included in the analysis.

<sup>12</sup> This paragraph uses a number of terms derived from Second Language Acquisition as a convenient shorthand. I would like to thank an anonymous Language Learning reviewer for pointing out that CA can also be used to problematise such terms, as indeed I do in chapter 6.

<sup>13</sup> Indeed, Schegloff and Sacks (1973) published on adjacency pairs before turn-taking and repair.

<sup>14</sup> Taking sanctions means expressing righteous hostility on a social level. Extract 1.4 shows Child sanctioning Mother, which demonstrates why social categories cannot be accepted a priori as immutable constructs.

<sup>15</sup> See Heritage (1984b, p.260) for further discussion.

<sup>16</sup> See note 55 in relation to face and politeness.

<sup>17</sup> This finding is based on American English and may not apply to all cultures or languages.

<sup>18</sup> See Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998, pp.120-130).

<sup>19</sup> The discussion is intended as an introduction for non-practitioners. Within CA, the treatment of context is one of the most controversial topics and a variety of conceptions are expressed. Since one of the aims of this monograph is to emphasise elements of compatibility with other research methodologies, my conception of context is more broadly conceived. The reader is referred to Duranti & Goodwin (1992) and Sarangi & Roberts (1999).

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<sup>20</sup> McCarthy does not claim to be introducing CA.

<sup>21</sup> This is not to imply that all introductions to CA written by linguists constitute linguistic CA. Levinson (1983) and Markee (2000) are linguists, but base their accounts on ethnomethodological principles.